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1. Introduction 
 
The making of immigration and integration policies in the Netherlands has 
undergone notable changes over the past decades. While for a long time the 
Netherlands was celebrated for the success of its multiculturalist approach, 
nowadays there is an increasing emphasis on integration and adaptation to Dutch 
norms and values. In this regard, the Netherlands is one of the most striking 
examples among countries that have renounced the multiculturalist approach 
(Joppke & Morawska 2004). The trend from multiculturalism to assimilation has 
been accompanied by a second shift: from conflict avoidance to the politicisation 
and polarisation of immigration and integration issues. While in the 1980s there 
was agreement among the elites of main political parties not to raise immigrant 
issues, but instead to resolve them through technocratic compromise (Rath 2001), 
immigration and integration policies have now become a top political priority, even 
taking on a central symbolic importance to the Dutch political establishment. 
Given these changes, the central questions of this paper are: how and why Dutch 
immigration and integration policies have developed into what they are today. And 
to what extent the development path of these policies accounts for either a degree 
of Dutch exceptionalism or a more general development applicable to other 
European countries as well.1   
  To understand how and why immigration and integration policies have 
developed into the controversies they arouse today requires an understanding of 
how and why the policies have developed as such. In this paper, therefore, we will 
focus not so much on the content of immigration and integration policies per se, 
but on the processes that have led to these policies.2 This means that we will focus 
on what actors were involved in policymaking processes at particular times, how 
the policymaking was institutionally organised and how the policymaking process 
may have been affected by developments in wider institutional and political 
contexts. The focus will be both on immigration and integration policies. Although 
clearly interconnected, both domains have, at moments, evolved quite 
independently, involving different actors and self-organising in different ways. 
Therefore, we will approach immigration and integration as different policy 
subsystems – that is, as different institutionalised systems involving the 
participation of particular sets of actors around particular definitions of the issue at 
hand (Sabatier 1999). Such subsystems include, as well as exclude, particular others 
                                                 
1 This paper arose in the context of a series of meetings among an international network 
of researchers studying the development of immigration and integration policies in 
Western European, Central-Eastern European and Southern European countries, 
including Spain, Italy, Switzerland, France, Hungary, Austria and Germany. This network 
was part of the IMISCOE network, namely Cluster C9.  
2 Most of the literature on the Dutch case focuses on the content of immigration and 
integration policies and its developments over the course of time. The literature addressing 
questions around the processes of policymaking in these fields is rather modest and recent 
at that. It has been borne not only of the field of political and administrative sciences, but 
also from other disciplines such as history, sociology of law and anthropology (Penninx et 
al. 2005). This report is founded on such literature, and is additionally based on a series of 
interviews conducted for this project by the authors. Our interviewees comprised actors 
involved in the making of immigration and integration policies in the Netherlands. 
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(i.e. ‘selective mobilisation’), while tending to reinforce those policy ideas that are 
supported by the actors involved. 
  To this end, we will first describe the development of subsystems 
of immigration (Section 2) and integration policy (Section 3). In these sections, we 
will especially focus on two questions: 1) what the dominant pattern of governance 
has been and how it has evolved, and 2) who the actors in policymaking have been. 
Secondly, by comparing the internal dynamics of immigration and integration 
policies, and examining how both domains have become more and more integrated 
(Section 4), we will analyse the dynamics of interaction between the two domains, 
as they have become strongly interrelated over the past decade. Thirdly, we will 
analyse how macro-political developments such as depillarisation, reconstruction 
of the welfare state and changes in political culture have influenced the making of 
immigration and integration policies (Section 5). Finally, we will draw some 
conclusions about the Dutch case (Section 6) by focusing on the following 
questions: what patterns of policy dynamics do we find? How do these compare to 
the patterns that were found in other countries? Is there a case for Dutch 
exceptionalism, or is there a convergent pattern of dynamics in immigration and 
integration policies in other countries as well?  
 
 
 
2. Immigration policymaking 
 
In the post-war period, the central idea was that the Netherlands was not – and 
should not be – an immigration country (Ministerie 1970). With this perspective, 
immigrants from the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia) and Suriname, as well as 
labour migrants from Southern Europe, Morocco and Turkey, were seen as 
repatriates, temporary migrants or guest workers. Paradoxically, until the mid-
1970s, migration was only minimally regulated. Although residence and labour 
permits were officially required in order for migrants to live and work in the 
Netherlands, the enforcement of these provisions was limited and regularisations 
granted on an individual basis were common (Doomernik Forthcoming).  
  The Netherlands’ precedent reputation of not being an immigration nation 
was contrary to the fact that large immigrant groups were staying in the country for 
long periods of time, if not permanently. This led to mounting tensions in the mid-
1970s (Entzinger 1975) and produced a gradual shift in immigration and 
integration policies. Since the beginning of the 1980s, the presence of long-term 
factual immigrants had been recognised. It was a major political goal to integrate 
them into Dutch society, yet the immigration of immigrant groups was still seen as 
a historically unique event, and it was believed that further immigration should be 
restricted or prevented (Penninx et al. 2005). The policy’s shift towards integration 
was thus not an implication that the current immigration was recognised any 
differently. Alongside the implementation of integration policies, in the 1980s and 
1990s, more restrictive immigration policies were implemented and enforced 
regarding labour migration, and later, on family migration and asylum. 
  Since there was no discussion on whether the Netherlands should be an 
immigration country or not, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, increasing restrictive 
immigration policies were formulated and implemented in a rather de-politicised 
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context. Indeed, in comparison with integration policies, until recently, new 
immigration regulations were passed with little political debate and relatively low 
implication of different political and social actors. In this regard, immigration 
policymaking was less explicit than integration policies. This explains why 
migration policies have often been seen as ‘quasi non-policies’. As pointed out in 
our earlier publication (Penninx et al. 2005) of the literature on Dutch immigration 
and integration policymaking, this perception has also shaped the scholarly debate. 
Indeed, the literature on immigration policymaking in the Netherlands (particularly 
in the social sciences) is relatively scarce. 
  However, in the past years, increasing restrictive migration policies and the 
politicisation of integration and immigration issues have opened up the public and 
political debate. This has been accompanied by the inclusion of new actors in the 
formulation and implementation of immigration policies. In particular, the 
evolution of the network of actors in immigration policy seems to have followed 
that of integration policies: while such policies used to be formulated at the 
national level and implemented top-down, the last years have seen a more complex 
picture of the involved actors emerge. The making and implementation of policies 
has been shifted up – to international and supranational instances; out – to private 
actors such as NGOs and churches; and down – to local authorities. 
  In contradistinction to integration policies, immigration policies have not 
been comprehensive and coordinated. This has been due to the lack of clear 
policymaking structure. Indeed, the formulation of labour, family and asylum 
migration policies has been determined by different ministries, institutions and 
other political and social actors, as well as by different dynamics and at varying 
moments in time. For instance, while the Ministry of Justice has been responsible 
for the general admission and residence permits of foreigners, the Ministry of 
Social Affairs and Employment has been assigned to deal particularly with labour 
migration, and the Ministry of Culture, Recreation and Social Work has been given 
competency over the reception of asylum seekers. Consequentially, any description 
of the Dutch immigration policy subsystem must refer to three distinctly assigned 
processes: labour, family and asylum. Interactions among these three processes 
have taken place over the course of time, but their interrelations have been neither 
stable nor held within a unitary structure. 
 
 
 
2.1. Labour migration 
 
By the mid-1950s, the post-war reconstruction efforts in the Netherlands had led 
to labour shortages in various sectors, leading to the recruitment of foreign 
workers to fill these vacancies, which were mainly jobs for unskilled or low-skilled 
workers. With this purpose, recruitment agreements were signed with sending 
countries such as Italy (1960), Spain (1961), Portugal (1963), Turkey (1964), Greece 
(1966), Morocco (1969) and Yugoslavia (1970). These arrangements were 
formulated in consensual agreement among the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Employment, the employer’s organisations and trade unions. As in other Western 
European countries, it was generally accepted by social partners and the state that 
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continuous economic growth could only be achieved by relying on (presumably) 
temporary foreign labour. 
  Recruitment activities came to an end, however, upon onset of the 
economic recession that followed the first oil crisis in 1973. This was more the 
result of a lack of employers’ interest in new foreign workers than the consequence 
of an explicit immigration policy (De Lange Forthcoming). Unlike in France and 
Germany, measures to force migrant workers to return home were never 
implemented in the Netherlands. The government proposal to introduce a return 
bonus for those who would return voluntarily was broadly rejected. And while 
from 1973 onwards, the Netherlands proclaimed itself closed to labour migration, 
the declaration was more a matter of rhetoric than factual policy. Labour migration 
policies (the Labour of Foreign Workers Act, from 1979 to 1995, and the Labour 
of Aliens Act, from 1995 onwards) continued to channel the entrance of those 
workers deemed beneficial to the Dutch labour market. In the new economic 
context that was characterised by a loss of employment in industry and a parallel 
expansion of the service sector, these policies were meant to restrict the entrance 
of low-skilled foreign workers while channelling that of high-skilled immigrants, 
often from highly industrialised countries (Böcker & Clermonts 1995). In contrast 
to the 1950s and 1960s when corporatist structures were fully functioning, labour 
migration policies were formulated by the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Employment with little cooperation by trade unions and employers. For instance, 
the Labour of Foreign Workers Act was passed in 1979 notwithstanding criticisms 
of both employers’ organisations and trade unions. The weakening of the 
corporatist structure allowed Parliament, and hence its different political parties, to 
gain clout in labour migration policymaking. The parliamentary discussions on the 
Labour of Foreign Workers Act of 1979 illustrate how labour immigration policies 
were increasingly created by the government and discussed at length in Parliament. 
Unlike previous measures, this new law was widely debated. Left-wing parties, left-
wing liberals and the liberal party were opposed to the law. They argued that it 
would affect the position of foreign workers and institutionalise unequal treatment.  
  By the end of the 1980s, persistent labour shortages in particular economic 
sectors forced the Dutch government to deal with the demand for foreign labour 
in a more structuralised fashion. Consequently, the Dutch Employment 
Organisation, together with trade unions and employers, started to manage 
temporary labour migration through so-called ‘covenants’. These tripartite 
agreements permitted workers in particular economic sectors to be temporarily 
admitted to the country, while anticipating the availability of newly trained, 
qualified Dutch workers. Contrary to what would be expected, however, these 
agreements did not always lead to more liberal admission policy (De Lange 2004). 
In fact, in terms of policymaking, these covenants reinstated the corporatist 
tripartite body. The questions to ask then are: why did the government return to 
employers’ organisations and trade unions? And, moreover, why did employers’ 
organisations and trade unions agree to participate in these agreements?  
  In her analysis of a tripartite agreement on the recruitment and admission 
of non-EEA nurses, De Lange (2004) argues how the government might assume 
that employers will comply with the temporality of migrant labour more willingly, 
if they themselves have previously agreed on it. As far as the participation of 
employers’ organisations and trade unions, De Lange identifies one of the main 
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possible reasons: a means to get financial support from the government for 
projects initiated by health care institutions, so as to lessen shortages on the 
national health care labour market. Although more research should still be done on 
the covenants, it seems that these tripartite agreements were made to legitimate 
particular government initiatives, rather than to represent the common interest of 
three different parties. Parallel to measures designed to control the admission of 
foreign workers, the Dutch government has, since the early 1990s, aimed to reduce 
irregular immigration. Although this initiative was particularly fuelled by the 9/11 
attacks and the Netherlands’ electoral turnaround in 2002, the process was started 
long before. After several measures designed to reduce irregular migration, the 
Ministry of Justice introduced the Linkage Act (1998) as the centrepiece to the 
principle of an ‘integrated immigration policy’ (Pluymen 2004: 76). This measure 
made all social security benefits dependent on an immigrant’s legal residence status, 
including rights and access to secondary or higher education, housing, rent subsidy, 
handicapped facilities and health care. Driving this act was the assumption that an 
exclusion of access to public services would push back irregular migration. 
 While previous measures to reduce irregular migration passed with little 
public discussion, beyond Parliament, the Linkage Act generated widespread 
protest from doctors, teachers, legal experts, prominent politicians and 
representatives from a broad range of public, semi-private and private 
organisations. Representatives of local governments also campaigned against the 
new law and seemed to steer a course for non-enforcement. In general terms, the 
new law was claimed to be unnecessary, immoral and unworkable. This general 
opposition, in contrast to the ramifications of creating other labour migration 
policies, resulted in a number of substantial alterations to the bill. For instance, 
professionals were not forced to report irregular immigrants to the Aliens 
Department; restrictions concerning education for children were lifted; and 
whereas irregular immigrants would initially have only been entitled to medical care 
in ‘acute and threatening situations’, this term was eventually superseded by the 
prospect of requiring ‘imperative medical treatment’. 
  Moreover, the Linkage Act led to the inclusion of other actors. First of all, 
private actors became the masterworkers of its implementation, since they were 
supposed to control the access to social services. By having private actors 
participate in migration management, they could simultaneously work to influence 
the actual process of implementation. For instance, various studies (Van der Leun 
2003, 2006; Pluymen 2004) have shown that workers in the domain of social 
assistance and housing have displayed a much more accepting attitude towards the 
Linkage Act than doctors and teachers who, in contrast, might tend to let their 
professional ethics prevail over the new regulations. Secondly, the exclusion of 
undocumented immigrants from social services led to the shift of new support 
activities downwards, to local authorities, and out to churches and other support 
organisations. In other words, local funds and churches, societal organisations and 
private individuals came forward to support irregular immigrants in those services 
that were no longer being covered by the Dutch state. 
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2.2. Family migration 
 
In the 1960s and early 1970s, the assumption that labour migration in the 
Netherlands was temporary resulted in relatively strict regulations regarding family 
reunification. Although in the 1970s, family immigration was not yet a central 
issue, when evoked in parliamentary debates, the issue was discussed within a 
highly moral discourse framework (Bonjour 2006: 4). In particular, Christian 
parties regularly emphasised the importance of taking into account the ‘human’ and 
the ‘social’ aspects of labour migration, referring to the ‘forced’ separation of guest 
workers from their families as ‘extremely painful’ and a source of ‘suffering’ 
(Kamerstukken II 1960-1: 3653-5, quoted in Bonjour 2006: 4). Despite explicit 
concerns over family unity, the government did not change family migration 
regulations, arguing that circumstances unfortunately did not allow for less ‘strict 
policies’ (Kamerstukken II 1962-63b: 19-20, quoted in Bonjour 2006: 5). 
  In response to the first report of the Scientific Council for Government 
Policy (1979)3, in 1983, the government published a memorandum on minorities, 
entitled ‘Minderhedennota’ (Ministerie 1983). In this memorandum, protection of 
the unity of the immigrant family remained unquestioned, but now the permanency 
of immigrants’ stay was accepted as a starting point for integration policies. In 
principle, this new approach made the family part of the integration process. And 
in practice, family reunification (i.e. the bringing over of spouses and children of 
resident families) peaked in the early 1980s. Thus, when in the same year the 
Ministry of Justice decided to introduce restrictions to family formation (i.e. 
bringing over new marriage partners), the measure was immediately met with fierce 
resistance from progressive parties (PvdA, GroenLinks, SP and D66), who argued 
that it undermined the principle of equal treatment at the heart of the new 
minorities policy. In this regard, liberal family migration policies were part and 
parcel of the ethnic minorities policy, and particularly, of their emphasis on socio-
economic integration with respect for own cultural identity.  
  However, the shift in the early 1990s, from a group-oriented approach to 
one focusing on individual integration, caused a turn away from the principles of 
protecting family unity. This neglected the family’s key role in the development of 
cultural identity and integration, for the sake of fostering protective measures to 
promote social cohesion in society (Van Walsum 2002: 143). In other words, 
family migration started to be seen as a problem for the integration of individuals, 
of families and, thus, of society as a whole. This reasoning justified restrictive 
family migration policies. As presented in the media and stated in many public 
debates, a broad majority of Parliament believed that, due to a lack of knowledge 
and skills, those newcomers who immigrated in the framework of family formation 
or reunification would fail to integrate, or at least retard the integration process. 
Therefore, unlike in the early 1980s, in the 1990s and 2000s, more restrictive family 
migration measures were introduced with little debate.  
  As family migration regulations became more and more restrictive, 
international treaty obligations, particularly Article 8 of the ECHR’s European 
                                                 
3 The Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) is an advisory body that gives 
solicited and unsolicited advice to the national government regarding all kind of policy 
issues. 
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Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Liberties, became an increasingly 
important counter reference. To prevent violations to the right of family life, in 
1994, a clause was introduced in the ‘Instructions for the Aliens’ Police’. It stated 
that the government could – in cases of ‘compelling reasons of a humanitarian 
nature’ (Kamerstukken II 1995-96, quoted by Bonjour 2006: 15) – use its own 
discretion to grant admission to aspiring family members, even if predetermined 
conditions were not met. As Bonjour observes, this demonstrates how ECHR 
Article 8 came to be considered an external constraint on national policy options. 
Not only is this a contrast to the ethical and ideological considerations presented 
by Dutch parliamentarians in the 1970s (Bonjour 2006: 16), but it also introduces 
an important new and external actor in Dutch family migration policymaking. 
  The current dominant discourse that family migration is a potential threat 
for integration is most clearly embodied in a new law that was passed in 2005. This 
law requires non-Dutch family members of residents who want to immigrate to 
pass an exam that tests their basic knowledge of the Dutch language and how well-
informed they are about Dutch society. The exam must be taken in the country of 
origin and is a requirement for permission to enter the Netherlands on the basis of 
family reunification. However, a number of recent verdicts by the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECHR) pose important challenges to this requirement. In 
particular, the Court has emphasised the notion that states must allow parents and 
children the freedom to enjoy in each other’s company. Moreover, a recent 
jurisprudence has stressed the need to respect the right of both married and 
unmarried couples to be able to continue to cohabit, even when issues of 
immigration or public order are at stake (Van Walsum 2004). We can thus 
conclude that family migration policymaking has gone beyond the scope of the 
Dutch political arena, bringing in the EU and international human rights 
organisations as potentially important actors.  
 
 
 
2.3. Asylum migration 
 
Asylum policies in the Netherlands have been developed, mainly on an ad hoc 
basis, following the increase of asylum seekers during the 1980s and 1990s. From 
1977 to 1987, annual quotas were established to determine the number of refugees 
invited to resettle in the Netherlands. However, policy shifted with 1987’s 
introduction of the Regulation on the Reception of Asylum Seekers (ROA), the 
growing numbers of spontaneous asylum seekers, a housing shortage and an 
increase in the costs municipalities had to pay for social benefits, etc.  The first aim 
of the ROA regulation was to curtail giving asylum seekers access to independent 
housing and social benefits, and instead to offer them central reception and 
modest sums of pocket money. Muus (1997) observes that the ROA regulation, 
described as ‘austere but humane’, was not only made to relieve the growing 
housing and financial problems of the major cities but also – and above all – in 
order to prevent the Netherlands from becoming an attractive destination country. 
This shift made evident how reception policies were in fact, and in perception, a 
significant component for managing asylum flows. 
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 Due to the growing number of newly arriving asylum seekers from 1989 onwards, 
the ROA regulation became a policy of providing minimal first accommodation, 
yet within a few years it became overburdened. In 1990, for example, the Ministry 
of Welfare, Health and Culture, which was in charge of the reception of asylum 
seekers, ‘tried to solve the problem by means of buying or renting holiday 
bungalows and caravans and finding more municipalities that were prepared to 
accommodate asylum seekers’ (Muus 1990: 47). As a consequence, in 1992 the 
New Admission and Reception Model for Asylum Seekers (NTOM) was 
introduced. An important difference found in NTOM was that asylum seekers 
would no longer be accommodated by decentralised ROA housing within 
municipalities, and municipalities would hence only bear responsibility for the 
reception and integration of those who had passed asylum procedures, namely 
status-holders and gedoogden (persons with a temporary expulsion waiver). 
  Moreover, in the early 1990s, the Ministry of Justice introduced several 
measures in order to reduce the number of asylum requests. First and foremost, 
this policy was manifested in measures taken to prevent asylum seekers from even 
arriving to the Netherlands. For instance, the increasing refusal to grant visas, 
though not exclusive to asylum seekers, limited entrances and hence constrained 
applications for asylum in the Netherlands. Secondly, introduced in 1994 was a 
temporary status referred to as a Conditional Residence Permit (VVTV). This new 
status only carries with it a relatively weak provisional residence title and hardly any 
access to public facilities. Thirdly, measures were also introduced to restrict access 
to asylum proceedings. As other European countries have done so, the 
Netherlands, in 1994, introduced procedures to expedite certain asylum 
applications, such as ‘manifestly unfounded applications’, those that were filed by 
people coming from safe countries of origin or safe transit countries where they 
could have applied for asylum, multiple applications and others. What’s more, 
people who had applied elsewhere were excluded. In the same vein, the new Aliens 
Act of 2000 introduced a single temporary status for the first three years of stay in 
the country, a limit to the right to appeal a negative decision and the duty of the 
rejected asylum seeker to leave the Netherlands within a fixed period. 
  Since asylum migration policies have been evidently ad hoc and based on 
arguments of manageability, rather than on grounds of principles, the general 
debate around their formulation and implementation has been highly technocratic. 
In this context, the creation of asylum migration policies has mainly taken place 
within the government, while there has been relatively little debate in Parliament. 
Opposition from lawyers and interest groups has hardly been a successful means to 
prevent the introduction of a series of restrictive measures. Neither cities nor local 
government have directly participated in asylum migration policymaking, although 
incorporated into the implementation of reception policies process. 
  Analysing the process of policymaking that began in 1986 and which 
resulted in the declaration of the ROA regulation, Puts (1991) observes that 
government is not a monolithic actor, but rather, a fragmented organisation. The 
seeming fragmentation of the government may be explained by the fact that its 
various ministries have different considerations and concerns, such as the Ministry 
of Welfare, Health and Culture’s manageability of reception; the Ministry of 
Interior’s defence of municipal interests; and the Ministry of Justice’s legal 
concerns over admission and deportation procedures. But on top of such 
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preoccupations, different dilemmas and ambivalent positions within the ministries 
have also had to be negotiated. What’s more, relations between party politics and 
ministries have differed. These differences were finally resolved through 
compromises, thanks to various formal and informal decision-making rules, and as 
the consequence of particular triggering events.  
  As in the cases of labour and family migration, a lack of debate and the 
relatively low impact of different political and social actors in policymaking led to 
the subsiding politicisation of integration and immigration issues. In particular, two 
sets of measures aroused concerns and rising responses from external actors. First 
of all, there was the progressive exclusion of ‘failed asylum seekers’ from social 
benefits and the government’s insistence on their return to countries of origin. 
Secondly, there came the introduction of accelerated asylum procedures and a 
common temporary status for the first three years, as well as a limit on the right to 
appeal a negative decision.   
  The first set of measures sought to reduce the number of undocumented 
residents. This kind of measure was directly opposed by local authorities, who had 
to deal with these residents in day-to-day practice. Notably, in February 2004 when 
the Dutch Tweede Kamer (Parliament’s  lower house) accepted the Minister for 
Immigration and Integration’s proposal to expel up to 26,000 ‘failed asylum 
seekers’ over the following three years, many big cities opposed the policy, arguing 
for their settlement and integration into Dutch society. Neither did front-line 
organisations, such as the Central Reception of Asylum Seekers (COA), commonly 
comply with the Minister’s rulings on this issue. Finally, church organisations and a 
strong network of the approximately 10,000 volunteers of the Dutch Refugee 
Council came to provide support for these failed asylum seekers. This opposition 
by local authorities and grassroots organisations illustrates the tension between 
policy formation at the national level and the often clashing effects that surface 
once policy is implemented 
  The second set of measures was aimed at reducing the number of asylum 
applications and the duration of asylum procedures. These measures have aroused 
immediate concerns not only from refugee advocacy groups and academics within 
the Netherlands, but also from the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) and Human Rights Watch (HRW). One basic criticism was 
that the measures resulted in a ‘routine infringement of asylum seekers’ most basic 
rights’ (HRW 2003). Other concrete criticisms were voiced over the erosion of the 
Convention Status, the accelerated procedures and the limit on the right to appeal 
a negative decision. This last measure is considered incompatible with the 
European Court of Human Rights case law. According to the Court, the claim by 
an alien that his or her deportation would result in a violation of the Court 
Convention’s Article 3 must be given rigorous scrutiny by the domestic courts. The 
fact that in 2003 the Council of State of the Netherlands replied to these concerns, 
by arguing that it does apply the rigorous scrutiny required by the ECHR, again 
illustrates how international and supranational institutions are becoming part of the 
policymaking process at the national level. 
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3. Integration policymaking 
 
As mentioned in the preceding section, in the post-war period, the Netherlands 
considered itself a non-immigration country (Ministerie 1970), a perception that 
explains not only the absence of explicit policy to regulate incoming flows of 
immigrants, but also the absence of integration policies for these newcomers 
during the 1960s and 1970s (Blok Commission 2004). The beginning of the 1980s 
in the Netherlands saw the design and implementation of explicit integration 
policies: collectively known as the Ethnic Minorities (EM) Policy. This was a 
relatively early development within Europe: only Sweden had started integration 
policies in the mid-1970s; other countries followed much later. 
  Dutch integration policy itself, as well as the creation of such policies, have 
shown remarkable shifts and changes in the 25 years of their existence. EM Policy 
started – much like in Sweden – as a welfare state policy intended to stimulate 
equality and the equity of vulnerable groups in society during the 1980s. It was 
developed in a relatively depoliticised context and laid down in a number of 
governmental documents (Ministerie 1980, 1981, 1983). In its implementation 
phase, this policy led to significant policy activity in many domains throughout the 
1980s. 
  But towards the end of the 1980s, public and political discourse began to 
look critically at EM Policy: it had ‘failed in important areas of labour and 
education’ (Scientific Council 1989), with criticism falling on the collective 
character of the policy (vis-à-vis target groups and their emancipation) and its 
‘overemphasis on cultural aspects’ (ibid.). This led to the formulation of further 
Republican Integration Policies throughout the 1990s. The new policy document 
(‘Contourennota’ Ministerie 1994) thus put the emphasis on the individual – rather 
than the group; accentuated the socio-economic aspects of integration – rather 
than the cultural and religious ones; and stressed, more than ever before, 
individuals’ citizenship responsibilities in integration processes. This led to new 
directions of policy implementation throughout the 1990s including, at one end of 
the spectrum, the nationally instituted courses given to newcomers as an 
introduction to Dutch society, and at the other end, more area-based and urban 
policies. 
  The beginning of the 21st century was primed for a new shift in policy 
orientation, by now embedded in a full-fledged politicisation of the topics of 
immigration and integration. The dominant view came to be that integration 
processes and policies had fundamentally failed, and moreover, that the social 
cohesion of Dutch society was endangered. The topics, framed in such a light, 
were successfully exploited in 2002’s national election campaigns, thus also 
reinforcing the politicisation. What followed was the so-called Integration Policy 
New Style, as formulated in a letter of the Minister for Aliens’ Affairs and 
Integration (TK 2003-2004 29203, Nr. 1). A series of proposals and measures 
followed to significantly diminish immigration figures (the Netherlands has had a 
negative net migration balance since 2003), and to introduce mandatory forms of 
integration for newcomers and oldcomers alike. Observers have called these forms 
‘neo-assimilationist’. 
  How could such a remarkable development take place? The following 
section will analyse in more detail how these shifts and changes have occurred, 
13                                                            IMISCOE Working Paper: Country Report 
 
what triggers have contributed to these developments and which actors have been 
involved. Since these processes of change are gradual periods of time will be 
demarcated by decade. As indicated above, following somewhat later were the 
basic policy documents that embody such changes: the EM Policy in 1983 
(Ministerie 1983), the Integration Policy in 1994 (Ministerie 1994) and the 
Integration Policy New Style in 2003.  
 
 
 
3.1. Policies of the 1970s and before 
 
Because the Netherlands did not regard itself as an immigration country, those 
who happened to be there, such as guest workers, were supposed to return to their 
home countries (Scientific Council 2001). As a result, ad hoc measures for 
accommodation were the rule, and reception facilities were short-term-oriented 
and scarce (Penninx 1996). (The only exception to this rule was the assimilation 
policy for repatriates from the former Dutch East Indies). Accordingly, the two 
main policy goals concerned remigration and the accommodation of guest workers 
to Dutch society for as long as they would stay in the Netherlands. Maintaining 
migrants’ own identity was thus considered important, but as part of the mind 
frame that saw migrants as planning to return to their countries of origin. 
 In the 1970s, mainly within the Ministry for Culture, Recreation and Social 
Work (CRM), a welfare policy was developed to respond to the needs of some 
vulnerable groups, such as guest workers, asylum seekers, migrants from Surinam 
and the Dutch Antilles, Moluccans and the travellers known in Dutch as 
woonwagenbewoners, literally meaning ‘caravan dwellers’. Within this policy, many 
private institutions were initiated (and subsidised) to separately provide welfare 
services for each of these groups (Molleman 2004; Blok Commission 2004; 
Penninx 1979). Notwithstanding, many guest workers’ facilities, such as housing, 
were supposed to be offered by the companies employing them. Increasing family 
reunions, along with the concentration of guest workers and their families in 
specific urban areas, pushed local authorities to get involved. Often municipalities 
took their own initiatives in the domains of housing, education, health care and 
welfare, thus pressuring the national authorities to recognise – and to finance – 
these measures. One of the most notable measures of the decade was the Mother 
Tongue and Culture Programme (1974), which was explicitly aimed at the 
reintegration of migrant guest workers’ children in their societies of origin. But, 
contrary to all prognoses, many guest workers did not return to their sending 
countries after the recruitment stopped and the economic crisis that followed in 
the late 1970s. In fact, migrant communities, particularly those from North Africa 
and Turkey, grew significantly through family and asylum migration. The rising 
unemployment rates of migrant workers and the arrival of their families brought 
demands for specific measures on the political agenda. For instance, schools with 
high numbers of immigrant students demanded funds for specific reception 
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courses, creating the Landelijke Commissie Voortgezet Onderwijs aan 
Anderstaligen (LCVO), a national federation to lobby in that direction.4 
  The administrative layout of the policies described above was problematic. 
Different ministries were involved for individual target groups and policy domains. 
For example, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, which was 
responsible for the labour market and work permits, tended to hold onto the idea 
of temporality of migration. The Ministry of Culture, Recreation and Social Work, 
which oversaw matters of general welfare, was directly confronted with the 
problems of reception, becoming more aware of the growing tensions between 
supposed temporary stay and factual long-term settlement and thus pleading for 
change. There were thus difficulties in coordinating the measures among ministries 
and, what’s more, a certain rivalry existed (Hoppe 1987; Blok Commission 2004; 
Penninx 1979; Scholten & Timmermans 2004).5  
 It was also during the 1970s that scientists started to get involved. As one 
of the first, Entzinger (1975) drew attention to the gap between de facto 
permanent settlement of immigrants in the country and a policymaker’s view of 
temporary migration.6 He emphasised the risk of not acknowledging the problem. 
In 1976, the Ministry of Culture, Recreation and Social Work installed the 
Advisory Committee on Research on Minorities (ACOM), which united academics 
in this domain within a policy frame.  
 In sum, there had been a mixture of pressures for policy change coming 
from the public opinion and the media, local authorities, academics and civil 
servants. It was the Scientific Council for Government Policy’s report ‘Ethnic 
Minorities’ (1979) that acted as a catalyst: it pleaded to fully recognise that a 
number of immigrant groups had settled permanently in the Netherlands and to 
start an active policy aimed at the integration of what it called ‘ethnic minorities’ in 
society. In a first reaction to the report (Ministerie 1980) the government accepted 
the advice, decided to develop an EM Policy and to install a strong coordinating 
structure for such policy within the Ministry of Home Affairs. The new direction 
of policies gained full parliamentary support, which was symbolised in the fact that 
the government coalition of Christian Democrats and Liberals nominated the 
oppositional Labour Party politician Henk Molleman as director of the 
coordination department within the Ministry of Home Affairs. 
 
 
                                                 
4 A special case illustrating the discrepancy between the reality of permanent settlement 
and the norm of temporal stay has been that of the Moluccans: ex-soldiers of the colonial 
army in the East Indies who came to the Netherlands with their families in 1951. 
According to some observers, the terrorist acts of hijacking trains and the occupation of 
the Indonesian Consulate and Embassy, a Dutch school in Assen and a provincial 
government building by young Moluccans in the mid-1970s has contributed significantly 
to pressures towards policy changes.  
5 Such difficulties of coordination were brought to the political fore in a 1978 
parliamentary motion (motion Molleman, PvdA) in which the Minister of Home Affairs 
was asked to take responsibility for coordinating policy pertaining to all minorities. This 
idea was realised later in 1980 when the government had decided to work towards the 
general Ethnic Minorities Policy. 
6 Notably, Han Entzinger was working at the staff department of the Ministry of Culture, 
Recreation and Social Work when he wrote this article. 
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3.2. Ethnic Minorities Policy in the 1980s  
 
The basic rationale of EM Policy was that specific groups in Dutch society that 
combined a low socio-economic status with being perceived as ethnically and/or 
culturally different would run the risk of becoming permanently marginal groups in 
society. Low-status immigrant groups thus became target groups of this policy, as 
did some native groups such as the woonwagenbewoners and the long-established 
gypsies. The main principles of the new EM Policy can be summarised in three 
points: 
1) The policy aimed to achieve the equality of ethnic minorities in the 
socio-economic domain; inclusion and participation in the political domain; 
and equity in the domain of culture and religion within constitutional 
conditions.  
2) The policy was targeted at specific groups regarded as endangered of 
becoming distinct minorities: guest workers, Moluccans, Surinamese and 
Antilleans, refugees, gypsies and woonwagenbewoners.  
3) The policy should cover all relevant domains and ministries, and be 
anchored strongly in the governmental organisation. As a result came the 
creation of a department for the coordination of minorities policy (Directie 
Coordinatie Integratiebeleid Minderheden) within the general directorate of 
Home Policies, as opposed to within that of Security and Order (Molleman 
2004). The idea behind placing the coordinating unit in the Ministry of 
Home Affairs was that it was a policy for new citizens, and therefore that 
the Ministry responsible for cities and provinces should be in charge. 
Migration policy was defined as a non sector-specific responsibility 
(Scholten & Timmermans 2004).  
 
In order to prevent ethnic minority formation by promoting socio-economic 
equality and cultural and religious equity, emancipation of these groups was seen as 
important. Thus, their participation in all spheres of society, including the political, 
was to be encouraged. An important assumption was that development of identity 
– both individual and group – would stimulate the minority’s emancipation within 
the community and would have a positive influence on its integration in broader 
society as well (Blok Commission 2004). 
The 1980s have come to be seen as the heyday of the EM Policy. Irrespective of 
how the outcomes are evaluated, the range of policy initiatives is impressive, 
especially when compared to other European countries in the same period. In the 
legal-political domain, for example, the Netherlands’ full legislation was scrutinised 
for discriminatory elements on the basis of nationality, race and religion (Beune & 
Hessels 1983), and many changes were made. Anti-discrimination legislation was 
reinforced, and a structure for discrimination-related reporting and consultation 
was established. What’s more, in 1985, active and passive voting rights for alien 
residents were introduced. In 1986, Dutch nationality law was modified to include 
more elements of ius soli, thus making it much easier for alien immigrants and their 
children to become Dutch citizens. Over the course of time, a consultation 
structure for all target groups of EM Policy was established to give them a voice in 
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matters regarding their position in society.7 Subsidising EM organisations, both at 
national and local levels, and trying to engage them in integration efforts became 
an important strategic aspect of policy implementation.  
 In the socio-economic domain, three themes were key: the labour 
market/unemployment, education and housing. In EM Policy, several initiatives 
were taken to combat high unemployment rates, including a law inspired by the 
Canadian Employment Equity Act, and even affirmative action by national and 
local governmental employers during the period 1986 – 1993. The effects of these 
measures, however, have proven weak.  
 Measures in the domain of education have been an important part of EM 
Policy from the beginning. Actually, most of the specific financial resources of EM 
Policy have, by far, been spent in this domain, predominantly on measures to 
compensate arrears of immigrant children in the regular educational system. That 
was implemented by a point system in which schools received significantly more 
money for children of immigrant background than they received for standard 
middle-class, native pupils. Immigrant and minority children were rated at 1,9, 
while native children of low socio-economic background were rated at 1,25 (the 
standard was 1). Apart from this general financial assistance to schools, a relatively 
small part was also dedicated to specific measures: education in the native language 
and culture of immigrants.  
In the domain of housing, a fundamental change was introduced in 1981 to allow 
legally residing aliens full access to social housing, which had been previously 
denied. Given the fact that social housing comprises the majority of all housing in 
big cities in the Netherlands, this measure had very positive consequences for the 
position of alien immigrants. 
 In the domain of culture, language and religion the EM Policy may be 
called ‘multicultural’ avant la lettre.8 The aim to develop migrants’ culture, in keeping 
with the EM Policy philosophy, was theoretically left to the groups and their 
organisations, and delimited by acknowledgement of general laws in the 
Netherlands. The role of the government was defined as that of facilitating, i.e. 
creating opportunities for minorities, such as special programmes in immigrant 
languages in the media.  
 As for religion, ‘new religions’ could legally claim facilities, such as 
denominational schools and broadcasting resources, on the same conditions as 
established religions. The outcome was the relatively quick institutionalisation of 
Islam (Rath et al. 2001).  
 Throughout the late 1980s, disappointment with EM Policy was growing, 
but it was only by the early 1990s that it became the topic of intense public debate 
and surrounding criticisms. The first strong critique on the EM Policy was 
formulated in a new Report of the Scientific Council for Government Policy (1989). 
Briefly stated, its message was that too little progress was being made in two crucial 
                                                 
7 In 1985, a National Advisory and Consultation Body (LAO) was established to represent the 
most important minority organisations. The LAO was to advise the government on issues of 
immigrant integration and to be consulted in the context of administrative issues relating to 
integration policy. In 1997, the LAO was replaced by the National Consultation Body for 
Minorities (LOM), an institution with a weaker mandate. 
8 In the policy documents of 1981 and 1983, the term ‘multiculturalism’ was not used. Referring 
to EM Policies as ‘multiculturalist’ policies, particularly by adversaries, is something that was 
only later introduced. 
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domains: labour market and education. This evaluation intimated another criticism: 
too much attention was being given to issues of multiculturalism and the subsidising  
of organisations. It was feared that this imbalance of attention could result in 
hindering – rather than enhancing – individual participation to better the labour 
market and opportunities in education. The subsequent advice of the Scientific 
Council (1989) was to make more efforts in the key areas of labour and education, 
and to do so, in a more compulsory way. ‘Obligations of migrants should be more 
balanced with the extended rights’; policies should focus less on cultural rights and 
facilities. 
 Other elements of criticism were later added. For one, Frits Bolkestein, the 
then Liberal Party leader and head of the political opposition in Dutch Parliament, 
suggested in a public speech in 1991 that Islam formed a threat to liberal 
democracy, it was a hindrance to the integration of immigrants, and that immigrant 
integration should be handled with more courage.  
 
 
 
3.3. Integration Policy in the 1990s 
 
Policy did not change immediately in response to such critiques, but the seeds for a 
different conception of it were sown, to grow later. A first distinct change in policy 
focus is found in new policy document, ‘Contourennota’ of 1994 (Ministerie 1994). 
In this document a renewed integration policy with a more ‘republicanist’ character 
was adopted, focusing on ‘good citizenship’ and ‘self-responsibility’ as its guiding 
principles. The argument was that citizenship entails not only rights, but also 
duties, and that each citizen must be active and responsible for himself or herself. 
In accordance with the advice of the 1989 report of the Scientific Council for 
Government Policy, this new ‘integration policy’ reflected three main changes in 
comparison with EM Policy: 1) a shift away from target groups to individuals who 
are in a disadvantaged position; 2) a strong focus on the socio-economic 
incorporation through labour market and education measures; 3) a shift away from 
cultural and multicultural policies as well as away from the strong reliance on 
immigrant organisations. 
 The social-democrat victory in the national elections of 1994 led to the so-
called Purple Coalition: the Labour Party (PvdA) together with the conservative 
liberals (VVD) and left-wing liberals (D66). This meant that the cabinet chose to 
put ‘the delicate cultural dimension outside of the field and to focus on the 
economic activation of individual migrants’ (Scholten & Timmermans 2004). The 
focus on economic integration of individual immigrants recommended by the 1989 
Scientific Council report fitted very well with the general policy line of the 
government, whose motto was ‘work, work, and once again work’9. Thus, 
measures specifically targeted at ethnic minorities were abandoned. From 1997 
until 2001, considerable sums were invested in general schemes to fight 
unemployment. And although these schemes were not specifically earmarked for 
                                                 
9 Top measures included those such as the subsidised Melkert jobs for the long-term 
unemployed. 
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ethnic minorities (Blok Commission 2004), one hope was that they would promote 
their participation nevertheless.  
 A new policy instrument apropos of the new philosophy was the civic 
integration courses10 that aimed to facilitate the initial integration of newcomers. 
This instrument for integration was developed at the local level among a number 
of cities in the Netherlands beginning in the early 1990s. In these reception 
courses, newcomers were given a toolkit comprising Dutch-language training 
material and information about how important institutions in Dutch society 
function. Local policymakers felt the urge to provide these tools to all newcomers 
whom they believed needed them, and so the policy was systematically developed 
in their cities. However, this instrument for integration, as it were, was later 
consumed by national politics, and through 1998’s WIN law (Wet Inburgering 
Nederland), it was made national reception policy.  
 Another way of transforming policies to keep in accordance with the new 
philosophy was framing much of integration facilities in area-based policies (rather 
than group-based ones). In 1994, the Ministry of Home Affairs started establishing 
a policy for deprived areas in major Dutch cities. This practice could be 
understood as a replacement of integration policies, for these targeted areas are, for 
the most part, comprised of an ethnic minority population. The ‘area’ is chosen as 
primary policy category instead of groups in society.11 Area-based development 
programmes were – and still are – a way of introducing redistributing measures in 
neighbourhoods where ethnic minorities are important recipients. The emphasis 
shifted in the course of time from housing and urban renewal (sociale vernieuwing 
1990) to more holistic programmes that integrated measures on housing, economic 
issues and socio-cultural dimensions (grotestedenbeleid 1994). Reflecting the above-
mentioned preoccupations of the Purple Coalition, this holistic approach thus 
focuses on socio-economic development.  
 The change from group-based towards area-based policies was also 
institutionally reflected. In 1998, a new so-called Minister for Urban Policies and 
Integration was nominated within the Ministry of Home Affairs. Although such 
area-based policies have served as a way of quitting group-oriented policies, group-
specific policies still survive at the local level of policy. 
 A series of events around the turn of the millennium triggered a new shift 
in the public and political discourse on immigration and integration issues, which 
would prove to later cause a revision of policy towards assimilationism (Vasta 
                                                 
10 In Dutch, these are called Inburgeringscursussen. The word ‘inburgering’ contains the word 
‘burger’ (meaning ‘citizen’), but its denotation is not that of naturalisation (i.e. becoming a 
national citizen). To avoid such confusion, the authors of this paper prefer the term   ‘civic 
integration courses` rather than ‘citizenship programmes`, for the courses do not 
necessarily prepare people for national citizenship.  
11 According to De Zwart (2005), a replacement is a policy option often chosen by 
governments to ‘avoid official recognition of social divisions thought to cause the 
problem, yet permit redistribution that benefits disadvantaged groups’ (see also De Zwart 
& Poppelaars 2004). The reason governments choose replacement is out of fear for side-
effects of targeted redistributive policies, which, ‘though considered necessary to reduce 
group inequality, may also promote ethnic conflict, create vested interests in group 
distinctions, diminish public support for redistribution, and thus defeat their own purpose’ 
(De Zwart 2005). In this sense, replacement could be considered a compromise between 
denial and accommodation of ethnic minorities. 
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2006). The shift brought the social and the cultural dimensions of integration back 
onto the agenda, though in a different light than it was before inspected. The 
search was no longer for ‘compatibilities’, but more for ‘commonalities’ that would 
help preserve national norms and values, thereby restoring and enhancing the 
social cohesion of society (Entzinger 2003). The integration issue also became 
increasingly cast in light of what was perceived to be a ‘clash of civilizations’ (Snel 
2003).  
 One of the initial catalysts in this development was the new national debate 
that was spurred on by publication of a newspaper article by Scheffer (2000). The 
article stated that the multicultural society in the Netherlands could be dismissed as 
either a ‘tragedy’ or a ‘disaster’12. Integration policy was declared a failure and, 
moreover, a call was made for a more assimilationist policy that would revive 
Dutch history and norms and values. As in the first debate over national minorities 
that took place in 1992, Islam and the integration of Muslim immigrants were 
identified as being especially problematic. International developments, such as the 
9/11 attacks in the United States reinvigorated such beliefs. Fennema (2002) has 
shown how the attacks triggered particularly fierce responses in the Dutch media, 
and led to several incidents of ethnic and religious violence.  
 In the meantime, the Dutch political arena witnessed the rise of the 
populist politician Pim Fortuyn. A true populist, Fortuyn profiled himself with 
harsh statements on criminality, direct democracy, immigration and integration. He 
pleaded for ‘zero migration’, argued that ‘the Netherlands was full’, and called for 
‘a cold war against Islam’.13 To these arguments that were not completely new, as 
we have seen, he added two elements: first, the accusation that the political elite 
had enhanced the failure of integration in the past by ‘hiding the real problems 
behind a curtain of political correct speech’; and second, the contention that the 
victim of all this was the common – and native, at that – Dutch voter. 
 Fortuyn’s populist campaign exploited this discourse very successfully. 
First, his party won a great victory in the local elections of March 2002 in 
Rotterdam, the second largest Dutch city. And although a few weeks later, Fortuyn 
was murdered – just before the national elections of May 2002 – his newly 
established LPF Party (Lijst Pim Fortuyn) won a landslide victory. In spite of  (or 
perhaps thanks to) his death, LPF gained 26 out of the 150 parliamentary seats and 
thus entered Parliament as its second largest party. This success changed the 
political discourse on immigration and integration radically. In fact, the aftermath 
of the Fortuyn victory compelled most parties to adapt their discourse on these 
issues (Penninx 2006).  
 A new series of notable events followed. However, beginning in 2002, it 
becomes uncertain whether the events themselves have truly triggered attention to 
the issues of migration and integration, or that the already high-alert status of these 
issues on the political agenda gave these events the appearance of being trigger 
events (Snel & Scholten 2005). First of all, a series of violent acts committed by 
immigrants drew broad media attention: in 2003, after being reprimanded for his 
improper behaviour by a young Dutchman, a young Moroccan kicked the 
Dutchman to death. In that same year, a group of North African youngsters in 
                                                 
12 Depending on the translation of the Dutch word ‘drama’ in the title of the article, ‘Het 
multiculturele drama’. 
13 Interview with De Volkskrant, 2 November 2001. 
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Amsterdam kicked a homeless woman to death. And in 2004, a Turkish youngster 
shot his teacher to death. Secondly, several events emerged around the issues of 
so-called fundamentalist mosques and radical imams: an imam labelled 
homosexuals as inferior; in a radical mosque, books were found in which people 
were called to kill homosexuals; and broad media attention was given to the 
mosque incident involving an imam who refused to shake hands with Rita 
Verdonk, the then Minister for Aliens’ Affairs and Integration, because she is a 
woman. Finally, a major climax came when the Dutch film-maker Theo van Gogh 
was murdered by a Dutch-Moroccan youngster who was affiliated to a radical 
Islamist network in the Netherlands.  
 All these events had two significant effects. First of all, they contributed to 
an image of policy failure. Parliament thus established a Parliamentary Research 
Committee on the Integration Policy in order to examine ‘why policy had thus far 
resorted in such limited successes.’ However, upon the Committee’s conclusion 
that integration had actually been relatively successful (Blok Commission 2004), 
the conclusion was widely dismissed as naïve. In fact, some observers complained 
how now a new political correctness had emerged that tabooed positive statements 
on the integration policy and on multiculturalism.14 Secondly, these events 
reinforced a new mode of policy discourse, described by Prins (2002)  as 
‘hyperrealism’: a shift from the 1990s ‘realist’ style of discourse demanding a 
‘tough’ approach to integration so as to turn immigrants into full citizens, to a type 
of discourse in which ‘being tough’ in itself became a goal, regardless of its 
potentially problematic amplifying effects. As such, it could be argued that 
Fortuyn, and later Verdonk, used the immigration and integration issue as an 
example with which to demonstrate their ‘tough’ approaches to the political 
establishment, in so doing promoting their own places in Dutch politics. 
 
 
 
3.4. Integration Policy New Style since 2002 
 
Thus, from 2002 onwards, the policy took another turn, as a new political majority 
was in power15. The renewed institutional setting foreshadowed changes: the 
coordination of integration policies was moved from the Ministry of Home Affairs 
(in which it had been located for 22 years) to the Ministry of Justice under a new 
Minister for Aliens’ Affairs and Integration. Integration Policy New Style, 
formulated in a letter by the Minister for Aliens’ Affairs and Integration (TK 2003-
2004, 29203, nr. 1), very much follows the paradigm of the 1990s, as it is based on 
the leading concepts of ‘citizenship’ and ‘self-responsibility’, but its emphasis is 
much more on the cultural adaptation of immigrants to Dutch society. The 
concept of integration policy was thus narrowed considerably. In addition, 
integration policy had become clearly linked, instrumental even, to immigration 
policy. It facilitated the selection of migrants and restricted new flows, in particular 
those of asylum seekers, family reunion and marriage migration. 
                                                 
14 TK, 6 April 2004, 63-4112. 
15 Cabinet Balkenende I was a short-lived coalition of Christian Democrats, liberals and 
the extreme right LPF; it was followed in 2003 by Cabinet Balkenende II, a coalition in 
which the LPF was substituted by the progressive liberals of D66. 
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The star measure in this new policy is the early integration of new migrants, 
something which was reformulated to serve purposes of both integration and 
migration control. Before entering the Netherlands, newcomers are obliged to pass 
an exam that proves their language skills and knowledge about Dutch culture and 
society. Once admitted, they have to follow civic integration courses. The granting 
of renewals of temporary and permanent permits is subject to successfully passing 
these courses.  
 The reception policy New Style thus includes significant modifications, 
when compared with the former decade. On the one hand, it introduces a new 
distribution of responsibilities among the various partners involved, the 
migrants’ own responsibility being the starting point. Beginning in 2007, 
newcomers have been expected to find and finance the civic integration courses 
themselves,16 and only if they pass the exam successfully, are they entitled to a 
refund of up to 70 per cent of their training expenses. In this programme, local 
authorities forego many responsibilities.  
 Erstwhile Minister for Aliens’ Affairs and Integration Verdonk had 
aimed to expand the target population of the new reception policy. In her first 
proposal, the target group for mandatory civic integration courses included all 
migrants between ages sixteen and 65, regardless of the amount of time they 
had spent in the country and even if they had been naturalised as Dutch. 
Deemed unacceptable, this proposal was revised with a vision to extend the 
requirements to everyone who has completed less than eight years of obligatory 
schooling in the country. This target would include the so-called oldcomers – 
people of migrant origin already living in the country – as well as naturalised 
immigrants and native Dutch who had been living abroad. Verdonk also 
specifically attempted to extend the requirement to immigrants from the 
Netherlands Antilles, justified by the supposedly problematic character of this 
minority group. The proposal, however, was rejected by Parliament, being 
deemed unconstitutional and discriminatory, since Antilleans have Dutch 
nationality to begin with. A final proposal was ultimately passed at the very end 
of the cabinet’s legislative term, in July 2006: it removed the new reception 
policy requirements for Dutch citizens – native or naturalised – and postponed 
its actual implementation to the next legislature. The proposal’s fate is therefore 
contingent on the next majority in power. 
 Four years into this New Style, a number of observations can be made 
regarding content, the policymaking process and the governance of policy. The 
first observation is that immigration and integration policies have been brought 
together, both in terms of content among a number of policy measures and in their 
institutional arrangement – within the Ministry of Justice, under the special 
Minister for Aliens’ Affairs and Integration.  
                                                 
16 Another element introduced – without much debate – since implementation of New 
Style integration policy concerns the financial: all costs of admission and immigration for 
the state are to be borne by the immigrants themselves. This means that immigrants have 
to pay sums of money for visas and residence permits, as well the renewal of them – this 
was previously unheard of. The application for a temporary residence permit costs €430 
(its renewal €285 per family member), and for a permanent residence permit, €890 
(VluchtelingenWerk Nederland 2004).  
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The second observation is that the process of policymaking – in the context of 
strong politicisation – is predominantly led, as well as set forth, by the Minister and 
the political parties in Parliament. At the same time, this policymaking process is 
rather selective in the topics it chooses: restrictive admission of new immigrants, 
forced return of failed asylum seekers and illegal immigrants, and mandatory civic 
integration courses. Undergoing a major recentralisation, these new policies were 
spearheaded from a top-down approach dominated by the Ministry and 
Parliament. 
 At the same time, as the third observation, which was also made by our 
interviewees at the local level, demonstrates, the majority of still-standing policies 
were left untouched or changed only marginally. Both ministries at the national 
level (such as those for education, housing and labour market) and local authorities 
continued most of their standing policies. This means that – contrary to the 
widespread image – many of the earlier instruments, developed over more than 
twenty years of integration policies, are still in place. Despite the predominant 
concordance that these policies have failed, they have had – and still have – their 
effects. 
 A fourth observation is that there is a growing resistance to the new 
national policies, particularly at that local level, coming from both the local 
government and civil society at large. Actors that were marginalised by earlier 
welfare policies, such as churches and action groups, have become active in favour 
of immigrants, trying to protect them against governmental action that is deemed 
unjust. Immigrants themselves are becoming – as citizens – important actors too, 
although in a different way than before: the local elections of March 2006 have 
shown that the migrant vote has become an important instrument for redress, 
particularly in big Dutch cities (Van Heelsum & Tillie 2006). In Rotterdam, for 
example, migrants have contributed significantly to the exit of the local LPF’s 
power by voting systematically for leftist parties, and thus bringing the Labour 
Party back in. And this has not gone unnoticed by political parties. Also on the 
national level, there have been growing indications of resistance against tone and 
content of migration and integration policies. One example is April 2006’s manifest 
‘Één land, één samenleving’ (meaning ‘one country, one society’), which was signed by 
former politicians from political parties across the board; another illustration 
comes from October 2006 when sixteen university chair-holders in migration and 
integration studies sent an open letter to the senate, in protest of the newly 
proposed WIN law. 
 The most significant reason for a swing back from populist policies in this 
domain is probably the fact that these populist politics have become an internal 
time bomb within the Liberal Party. This is best illustrated by the case of MP 
Ayaan Hirsi Ali. Hirsi Ali came to the Netherlands as an asylum seeker of Somali 
origin in the early 1990s, became naturalised and then went into politics. She was 
first affiliated to the Labour Party, but was later welcomed into the Liberal Party 
because of her clear stance against oppressive Islamic traditions. An ally to 
Verdonk in this respect, Hirsi Ali put the Minister (who profiled herself as the iron 
lady of tough immigration and integration policies in a difficult position when she 
admitted ‘en plein public’ that she herself had manipulated the asylum procedure with 
incorrect information. Verdonk’s immediate reaction – that her asylum and thus 
her naturalisation and membership in Dutch Parliament were not valid and should 
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be withdrawn – led not only to a crisis within the Liberal Party, but also to the fall 
of Cabinet Balkenende II. The migrant vote’s strengthening power and the divisive 
effect of populist politics within parties were what led to the remarkable fact that 
in the campaign for national elections on 22 November 2006 the topics of 
immigration and integration were no longer key topics. The topics have proven to 
be divisive within all major parties, not just the Liberal Party; and they further 
accentuate differences between national and local politics. Interestingly, these 
divisions do not run along mere ethnic lines (as the Hirsi Ali case shows).  
 
 
 
4. The interaction of immigration and integration policies  
 
So far in this paper, the dynamics of policymaking in the domains of Dutch 
immigration and integration policies have been described and analysed. It was 
observed how, although only gradually, the Netherlands’ identification as a country 
of de facto immigration, and possibly even a society of immigration or 
multicultural society, triggered policy responses in both subsystems. The dynamics 
of immigration policymaking varied significantly for each type of migration: labour 
migration, family migration and asylum migration. However, within this policy 
subsystem a general trend became discernable. The once relatively ad hoc 
responses to migration, along with a depoliticised, corporatist governance style of 
policy formulation, had evolved into more concerted political and administrative 
efforts in order to minimalise all sorts of migration. What’s more, this occurred in 
a policy context that itself had become much more politicised. Over time, the 
dynamics of integration policymaking also seem to have altered significantly, as 
illustrated by the succession of different policy paradigms over the past decades, 
from the 1970s’ ‘quasi-non policies’ and the 1980s’ Minorities Policy to the 
Integration Policy of the 1990s and eventually, effective since 2002, the Integration 
Policy New Style. This subsystem also revealed a trend: beginning in the 1970s, 
from a rather technocratic style of governance towards a more politicised style of 
governance (new realism/hyperrealism), begun in the 1990s and especially notable 
after the turn of the millennium. 
 This section will discuss the dynamics of interaction between these two 
policy subsystems. We will ask questions such as: how do patterns of internal 
dynamics in the subsystems of immigration and integration policy compare? And 
to what extent has there been interaction between developments in these two 
policy subsystems? Some observations in the above sections have already pointed 
to a certain degree of interdependence between developments in both subsystems, 
and to a growing ‘integration’ of immigration and integration policies. Thus, we 
will first observe some differences and similarities between the two sub-systems 
before examining their interaction with one another. 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Patterns of convergence and divergence 
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As for differences, they are first and foremost demonstrated by the way the 
subsystems are institutionalised within the central government. Whereas the 
integration policy has been characterised by a comprehensive or strongly unitary 
and centralised policy coordination structure (Guiraudon 2000), the institutional 
structure for the coordination of immigration policies appears to have been less 
comprehensive. Integration policies had been assigned since the early 1980s within 
the Ministry of Home Affairs (until their reassignment to the Ministry of Justice in 
2002). Within this department a strong – albeit fluctuating – structure was 
constructed and maintained to coordinate policies horizontally, between ministries, 
and vertically vis-à-vis local authorities, subsidised organisations, co-opted experts, 
ethnic elites and civil society actors. This system produced policy documents, 
monitored implementation, and had an explicit budget (separate from funds 
supposed to come from the regular budgets of ministries, municipalities and other 
policy actors). In contrast, the institutional location of immigration policies was 
(only until recently) far less clear: the Ministry of Justice had always had formal 
responsibility over admission of aliens, residence permits and possible expulsions, 
but the Ministry was not always the body to decide on policies regarding 
admission. This was the case, for example, with economic and asylum migrants, 
over whom other departments shared responsibility. As such, immigration policies 
were notably less comprehensive and less unitarily coordinated than integration 
policies. Immigration policies were, for a long time, subject to little debate, and 
policies were usually formulated ad hoc, in response to actual influxes of 
immigrants. Immigration policies thus have long been considered ‘quasi non-
policies’.   
 Another difference between the two policy fields has, since the 1990s, 
become more manifest. While both policies had originated largely on the national 
level, as would be expected in view of the Dutch tradition of a centralised 
consensus democracy, they are developing in different directions of multilevel 
governance. Immigration policy has been shifting upwards (to the EU level), 
outwards (among private agencies) and downwards (in implementing the Linkage 
Act for example) (Lahav & Guiraudon 2006). The shift upwards to the European 
level has also served to provide new intergovernmental venues for strengthening 
national control, as opposed to handing over policymaking competencies to the 
supranational level; within the European ‘intergovernmental’ arena there would be 
less resistance to tightening migration control than within many national political 
arenas (Guiraudon 2000). Only in domains like anti-discrimination is a more 
significant trend of Europeanisation apparent (Guiraudon 2006). By contrast, in 
the integration policy, a more pronounced trend of recentralisation can be 
observed. This is especially apparent in terms of policy formulation and how issues 
are framed, as well as in the specific topics that have spearheaded national policies 
and that have been linked to other issues on the national agenda. The 1990s’ trend 
towards decentralisation had thus been halted and, to some extent, reversed after 
the turn of the millennium. In the instance of civic integration courses, the shift 
outwards to private agencies has coincided with the recentralisation of state control 
over the courses, as in the case of the national integration exam. At the same time, 
however, this top-down dynamics of recentralisation appears to be limited: the 
institutional locus of many policy measures, such as in the domains of labour and 
education, has remained with specific ministries and local governments, all carrying 
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out their own measures over these files. This has led to the growing gap between 
national and local integration policies, similar to the decoupling or ‘décalage’ that 
Schain (1999) observed in France. There seems to be an increasing divergence 
between symbolic politics at the national level and more pragmatic problem-coping 
at the local level. 
 Similarities in internal policy dynamics between the two policy fields have 
been observed as well. Perhaps the most significant convergence is the 
politicisation of immigration and integration policymaking over the last decade. 
Both have become the subject of intense political debate, often framed in rather 
rhetorical and symbolical terms, and dominated by a negative tone. The attention 
implies that both policy subsystems have become less isolated from macro-politics 
and, what’s more, that they are increasingly vulnerable to external perturbations. 
Both have become top political priorities, also in electoral politics, leading to a 
different logic of policymaking processes. This has also led to similar patterns of 
resistance in both subsystems. Local governments especially have attempted to 
countervail the politicising tendencies in immigration and integration policies, 
calling for a more positive and pragmatic approach.  
 Another similarity, related to this politicisation, concerns the growing gap 
in both domains between policy rhetoric and policy practice. On the one hand, a 
strong variability in policymaking can be observed in the past decades, with both 
domains characterised by episodes of relative stability and punctuated with 
dramatic policy change (Scholten & Timmermans 2004). Such variability creates 
difficulties for evaluating policies, as the rules for measuring success or failure have 
also been in constant flux (Entzinger 2005). On the other hand, policy practice has 
shown what appears to be a strong tendency towards path-dependency (Snel 
&Scholten 2005). Policy practices that were established in one policy episode have 
often proven very resilient in periods that follow. For instance, the Mother Tongue 
and Culture Programme had a chameleon-like existence, with its multi-hued 
contributions to return migration in the 1970s, to the multicultural society in the 
1980s, and to acquisition of Dutch as second language in 1990s, before it was 
finally abandoned in 2001. Another example of policy resilience is shown by the 
persistence of labour migration long after its official termination in 1973 into the 
present day – despite all the discourse on bringing it to an end. National politics’ 
tough rhetoric on illegal migration notwithstanding, actual policy practices vis-à-vis 
illegal migrants appear to be much more subtle (Van der Leun 2006). The growing 
gap between policy rhetoric and policy practice emerges as the result of a general 
institutional path dependency, as well as the diverging patterns of multi-level 
governance (albeit differently manifested in the immigration and integration policy 
domains).  
 
 
 
4.2 Towards a common policy subsystem? 
 
How has the interaction between the two subsystems of immigration and 
integration developed in the course of time? At present, there seems to be a 
common policy system in the works for both immigration and integration policies, 
which since 2002, have been united and coordinated within the Justice 
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Department, under a special Ministry for Aliens’ Affairs and Integration. However, 
the relationship between immigration and integration has not always been like this.  
 In the early 1980s, the arrivals of newcomers were interpreted as 
historically unique events, demanding a – what was, in principle, temporary – 
minorities’ policy for these groups, as well as a restrictive immigration policy for 
preventing further immigration. The need for a restrictive immigration policy was 
then justified as a condition for a successful EM Policy: a constant influx of new 
immigrants would create a constant need for new policy efforts (Scientific Council 
for Government Policy 1979).  
 Such understanding of the relation between immigration and integration 
policies changed in the 1990s. The 1989 report of the Scientific Council for 
Government Policy called for a more realistic recognition of the permanent 
character of immigration: not only would the presence of minorities, but also 
immigration itself, be responsible for creating a permanent phenomenon in Dutch 
society. While the report did support a restrictive immigration policy, it also 
suggested adaptations in the integration policy, so as to cope with the constant 
influx of newcomers. In this vein, it recommended the development of civic 
integration programmes that would provide the link between the constantly 
arriving newcomers and their subsequent integration in Dutch society.  
 This definition of the relation between immigration and integration was 
largely adopted by government in the early 1990s. It soon led government to 
abandon the preceding decade’s relatively lenient policies on family migration, 
which came to be viewed as a growing problem for integration. But there were also 
ideas within governmental circles that went some steps further. By the end of the 
1980s, the Interdepartmental Working Group on Immigration (IWI), which was 
chaired by the Justice Department, argued that a realistic recognition of the nature 
of immigration should produce more than mere efforts to optimally restrict 
immigration. What needed to be accounted for was the immigration effect 
promoted by the very facilities to which minorities had access under the integration 
policy. Thus, immigration was not only to be restricted so as to promote 
integration, but integration policy should was to be restricted so as not to attract 
further immigration (Scholten Forthcoming 2007). These ideas, however, were not 
yet taken over in government policy.  
 Since 2000, Dutch society has witnessed the development of a more 
systemic connection between immigration and integration. Not only do policy 
memoranda speak explicitly of the need to restrict immigration so as to not 
endanger the ‘absorption capacity’ of Dutch society (Ministerie 2001), tougher 
integration policies have increasingly become a tool for restricting immigration. 
The new reception programmes described in Section 3 of this paper have become 
a means for the Dutch government to promote the integration of newcomers, as 
well as to discourage further immigration. In doing so, the programmes may 
simultaneously function as a mechanism through which to select those migrants 
who could prove beneficial for the Dutch economy.  
 
 
 
5. External factors 
 
27                                                            IMISCOE Working Paper: Country Report 
 
A number of developments external to immigration and integration policy have 
also influenced these subsystems. In this section, we will discuss the more 
important among them, including: the legacy of pillarisation, the development of 
the Dutch welfare state and the development of political culture in the Netherlands 
over the past decades.  
 
 
 
5.1 The legacy of pillarisation 
 
The legacy of pillarisation is an often raised explanation for Dutch exceptionalism 
in many domains(Hoppe 1987). Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, the 
Netherlands had grown into a segmented society, which was structured around 
four ‘pillars’. The pillars comprised specific social, political or religious groups 
(Protestants, Catholics, Socialists, Liberals), and were brought together only at the 
top where any inter-pillar conflict was ‘pacified’ by the elites of the pillars. As such, 
it was in the Netherlands’ tradition to accommodate pluralism through pillarisation 
and assuage conflict through elites. This particular facet of Dutch history has had 
pervasive effects on the country’s political culture and the structure of its political 
system as a ‘centralized consensus democracy’ (Lijphart 1968). Since the 1960s, 
secularisation and individualisation came to erode the social basis of Dutch 
society’s once pillarised structure. The role of religious institutions in society 
gradually decreased, their relation to the nation state was loosened, and a new 
citizenship-notion emerged to make a direct connection between individuals and 
the nation-state.  
 These changes notwithstanding, pillarisation has had an important 
influence on immigrant integration policies in two basic ways. The first way relates 
to how migrants themselves were ‘framed’. Whereas in other European countries 
immigrants were defined on the basis of class, race or colour, in the Netherlands, 
they were defined as ethno-cultural groups and ‘minorities’. Framing immigrants as 
minorities reflected the Dutch style of an accommodating pluralism: defining 
immigrants as another minority added to all those already existing. In addition, the 
pillarist tradition was reflected in how immigration and integration issues were 
coped with. The fragile coalition system of Dutch politics, a legacy in the history of 
pillarism, demanded that politically sensitive issues, such as immigration and 
integration, were depoliticised so as to avoid centripetal forces: ‘playing the race 
card’ for electoral gain, for example, could drive the political system apart 
(Guiraudon 2000). Especially in the 1970s and 1980s, these issues were 
systematically depoliticised (De Beus 1998; Hoppe 1987, 1993), accommodating 
conflict within relatively closed networks of policymakers, experts and ethnic elites. 
Issues ‘too hot to handle’ for politics were resolved through technocratic 
compromise (Rath 2001), creating a so-called ‘consensual style’ of using expertise 
(Renn 1995) as an authoritative source to create political consensus, rather than 
creating such a consensus through open political confrontation. But this style of 
policymaking started to break down in the 1990s, giving way to a much more 
conflictive style after the turn of the century. 
The second way pillarisation has proven influential is in the institutionalisation of 
its laws and regulations. Steady secularisation of the Dutch population and 
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decreasing significance of pillar institutions and organisations notwithstanding, 
laws and regulations did not change as much, nor at the same pace. Although 
ethnic minorities themselves never were as cohesive, sizeable and strong as the 
traditional pillars in the Netherlands used to be, the institutional legacy provided 
minorities with opportunities for the development of some of their own 
institutions. Legal provisions of all kinds, disseminated on an equal basis, led, for 
instance, to the recognition and establishment of Islamic institutions in the 
Netherlands. State-subsidised Islamic schools and an Islamic Broadcasting 
organisation are other remarkable examples (Rath et al. 2001). It was only from the 
1990s onwards that such developments became politically contested. 
 
 
 
5.2 Welfare state regime 
 
Another factor that has had a significant impact on immigration and integration 
policymaking is the development of the Dutch welfare state over the past decades. 
The Dutch welfare state regime has traditionally been classified as a conservative-
corporatist type (Esping-Andersen 1990; Van der Veen & Trommel 1999). This 
conservative-corporatist type involves a relatively high level of decommodification 
of citizens from market forces and the strong involvement of state and civil society 
actors, such as churches, labour unions and employers unions, in welfare state 
provisions. This model does not encourage universal labour participation among 
individuals, but tends to preserve the prevailing socio-cultural structure of society 
as expressed in family, class, status and, to some extent, also gender. It was in the 
context of this welfare state regime that Dutch integration policies started to 
develop in the 1980s. This was reflected in a policy that did not see immigrants 
exclusively as part of market forces; it did not just permit, but also stimulated, 
them to become emancipated as recognised cultural groups in Dutch society.  
 The end of the 1980s reveals poor results vis-à-vis the socio-economic 
aspect of the EM Policy: there is a general, fact-supported consensus that EM 
policies in the field of labour were ineffective throughout the 1980s, expressing in 
continued high unemployment and the low labour market participation of 
immigrants17. The position of constant weakness experienced by minorities was – 
                                                 
17 There are several interpretations of these results. Some focus on the basic assumptions 
behind the combination of socio-economic and cultural emancipation. They maintain that 
the focus on socio-cultural emancipation would have contributed to the perpetuation of 
socio-economic inequality, in contrast to the government’s expectation otherwise. Rath 
(1991), for example, has argued that the social construction of ‘ethnic minorities’ was 
meant to hide the economic and institutional dimension of the presence of immigrants 
behind the ethno-cultural dimension. As such, government interference in the position of 
‘minorities’ would have the adverse effect of perpetuating socio-economic disparities while 
legitimising socio-cultural differences; it would contribute to so-called ‘minority-
formation’, rather than prevent it. In the same vein, Entzinger (2006) has recently labelled 
this the ‘misdiagnosis effect’ of EM Policy, as the focus on socio-cultural differences 
would obstruct a realistic diagnosis of class differentials. Others put forward the 
interpretation that the government has made specific choices in its policy: compared with 
the original recommendations of the 1979 report by the Scientific Council, the 
government would have reversed the relation between socio-cultural emancipation and 
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in a direct sense – due to the general restructuring of Dutch economy, with its 
particular consequences for immigrants, as well as the result of deficiencies in the 
Dutch welfare state. It was argued that the lenient regime of access to benefits had 
turned minorities too much into ‘welfare categories’, trapped in and overly 
dependent on state provisions (Scientific Council for Government Policy 1989). By 
then, the welfare state’s viability had also become questionable for a number of 
reasons. Thus, the issues of immigration and integration and the need for welfare 
state retrenchment (Entzinger 2006) were brought together, producing a new 
perspective. The same Scientific Council pleaded in several reports for a more 
activating type of welfare state (Fermin 1997) of a more liberal regime. For 
immigrants, this meant encouraging them to ‘stand on their own feet’, as well as 
discussing their civic rights and duties as new citizens.  
 The rise of the 1990s Integration Policy was thus closely related to the 
general reform of the welfare state at the time, particularly involving a recalibration 
of the responsibilities of citizen, state and market. State interference vis-à-vis the 
socio-cultural position of immigrants gradually lost importance. Immigrants came 
to be treated more as ‘citizens’ endowed with specific civic responsibilities, who 
were also more exposed to market forces, and for which the policy facilitated 
citizens’ accommodation. Civic integration became a specific new instrument to 
‘equip’ immigrants so they might live up to their civic responsibilities for 
integrating in Dutch society. The relation between welfare state reform and 
restrictive immigration policy was embodied in the Linkage Act: this law should 
exclude all illegal residents from facilities of the welfare state.  
 Recent policy has witnessed the addition of a new element to the logic of 
political discourse. Whereas the articulation of socio-cultural differences has 
traditionally been perceived as a ‘corroding effect’ on social cohesion, it may, in the 
same vein, be seen as undermining the type of social solidarity necessary to 
maintain a viable welfare state (Entzinger 2006). So now, the basic issue is no 
longer how to promote socio-economic participation in order to keep the welfare 
state affordable, but rather, how to maintain social cohesion and solidarity in order 
to generate sufficient support for the welfare state.  
 
 
 
5.3 The macro-political context 
 
Finally, there came changes in the Dutch macro-political context specifically 
connected to developments in the domains of immigration and integration. First of 
all, the political style of the Netherlands has transformed from its pillarist tradition 
of a politics of accommodation to a new style particularly pronounced since the 
                                                                                                                                  
socio-economic participation, arguing that an amelioration of the socio-cultural position of 
minorities would lead to an amelioration of their socio-economic position (Verwey-Jonker 
Institute. 2004). Still, others do not question the principles behind the policy; instead, they 
assert that the government simply lacked means and instruments to implement effective 
distributive policies in the domain of labour. The government had lost its direct influence 
on the distributive mechanisms of the labour market and was not able to mobilise its social 
partners to take effective action (Penninx 1996, 2006).  
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2002 so-called Fortuyn Revolt in Dutch politics. The style of politics has shifted 
from conflict accommodation and de-politicisation towards primacy of politics and 
a more confrontational political culture. From its inception, the Fortuyn Revolt 
was at odds with the accommodating Dutch style, dismissing it as an undemocratic 
form of ‘back-room politics’. And immigration and integration policy have become 
the playing fields for this new political style (Wansink 2004). Especially in light of 
these issues, a ‘politics of avoidance’ has been replaced by a ‘politics of 
confrontation’ (De Beus 1998). This new style has had serious consequences for 
actors such as experts and ethnic elites. For example, 2004 witnessed the fierce 
contestation of the role of experts in this policy domain. Politics and media 
criticism emerged on how the development of policy ideas might in fact be in the 
hands of scientists who have multiculturalist biases. The technocratic type of 
science-politics relations that would have characterised this domain in earlier 
periods was now dismissed as undemocratic. As a consequence, the consensual 
style of using expertise in policymaking and implementation was now replaced by a 
more selective ‘pick-and-choose’ strategy aiming at scientific expertise (Penninx 
2005). 
 However, immigration and integration policies appear to have been as 
much a cause – as an effect – of macro-political developments, especially in recent 
years. Immigration and integration have been at the centre of the Fortuyn Revolt. 
For Pim Fortuyn, these issues provided a vehicle for political plans, which were 
turned into symbols for broader popular dissent as Dutch government and 
democracy malfunctioned (Wansink 2004). In the 2002 and 2003 Parliamentary 
elections, immigration and integration were, more than ever before, central 
electoral issues that not just the Pim Fortuyn Party, but all political parties, had to 
take a distinct stance on (Pellikaan & Trappenburg 2003). Failing integration 
policies and an alleged ignorance towards public concerns about immigration and 
integration became the greater symbols for a failing political system. In response, 
government and politics tended to politicise these issues more than ever before. 
This phenomenon has recently been described as the ‘articulation function’ 
(Verwey-Jonker Institute 2004: 201): politics must name and articulate the public’s 
sentiments and problems. Integration is here interpreted as encompassing 
something broader than mere immigrant integration, but namely, the integration of 
immigrants and natives within multicultural society (ibid: 197).  
 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper has analysed the creation of immigration and integration policies in the 
Netherlands, distinguishing between internal dynamics in the two subsystems, the 
interaction between them and a number of external factors. Why did these policies 
developed as such in the Netherlands, and is the Dutch case exceptional or does it 
reflect a more general trend to be found across Europe?  
 The Dutch case has revealed a sequence in policymaking, from the 1970s’ 
ad hoc policy responses to a technocratic type of policymaking throughout the 
1980s and 1990s, and finally, to the more symbolic politics that began in 2002. 
Initially, issues of immigration and the reception of newcomers were met with a 
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rather pragmatic, bottom-up approach. Welfare organisations and churches took 
care of most of the services for immigrants during the 1960s and 1970s, while 
businesses had an important role in the organisation of migration, especially when 
it came to labour migration. No official integration policy was developed until 
the1980s, as this would not have concurred with the idea that the Netherlands was 
not a country of immigration. Consequently, government was to cope with the 
pressure of concrete problems in a rather piecemeal way, as opposed to rethink the 
principles underlying matters of immigration and integration; such debates were 
even systematically avoided. 
 A different mode of policymaking was adopted in the 1980s, following the 
recognition that issues of immigration and integration required a more systematic 
government approach. Immigration and integration policy were now embedded in 
more fully institutionalised, albeit separate, policy subsystems with a limited 
number of actors who were involved in a technocratic design of policy. As for 
labour migration, corporatist triangles of government, employers and trade unions 
that regulated migration policies were reinstituted around the covenant policies. As 
for integration, government developed a strongly unitary coordination structure 
with a key role for the Home Affairs Department, and with the co-optation of 
ethnic elites and experts. These forms of policymaking involved a top-down design 
and pursuing a politics of de-politicisation, a delimiting of the debate, scaled down 
to a specific set of actors.  
 In the 1990s, this strong centralist practice changed. A trend of 
decentralisation is visible in the domain of integration. Local governments, 
particularly ones of the Netherlands’ largest cities, became more active, formulating 
their own local integration policies. Such policies addressed integration problems 
as they appeared on the local level, often approaching them more pragmatically 
than at the national level discourse. Tensions between local and national policies 
developed around certain issues, particularly immigration issues. The development 
of more explicit local integration policies in this period correlates with a shift from 
target group policies towards area-based policies. During the 1990s, immigration 
policies were primarily located at the national level, but at the same time, a trend of 
Europeanisation, privatisation and decentralisation (upwards, outwards and 
downwards) was also visible.  
 Finally, after the turn of the century, rapid changes took place. The topics 
of immigration and integration became a symbolic politics that were linked to 
broader issues in Dutch society that imbued them with for the power for popular 
dissent toward the political establishment. An unprecedented politicisation took 
place following the rise of Fortuyn in the Dutch political arena, which led to the 
articulation of popular ideas and sentiments concerning immigration and 
integration. As a result, the immigration and integration subsystems became more 
and more integrated, for restrictive immigration policies not only served the aim of 
facilitating integration, but tough integration policies worked towards the goal of 
discouraging immigration. These new policy developments are considered top-
down in the sense that they particularly involve a recentralisation of policy 
formulation; integration was framed in response to national developments, rather 
than to the concerns of local governments or other local actors. However, this has 
also contributed to the growing gap, or ‘decoupling’, between policy formulation 
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and policy implementation; that is, between symbolic politics at the national level 
and a more pragmatic, troubleshooting approach at the local level. 
 In certain respect, the Dutch case’s development differs from other 
European countries. It contrasts with Great Britain, where immigration and 
integration were politicised much earlier, but where the mode of policymaking has 
continued to be bottom-up rather than top-down (Favell 1998). It is different from 
the German case as well, where politicisation was held off for considerable time, 
much like in the Netherlands, but where, until recently, a pragmatic approach of 
coping with integration problems persisted (Guiraudon 2000; Joppke 1999). On 
the other hand, similarities are found in the way French policymaking has 
developed: as in the Netherlands, a pragmatic approach to coping with problems 
was initially exchanged for a sub-systematic form of technocratic governance, 
eventually to be replaced by symbolic politics (Favell 1998). However, this 
development occurred at a much quicker pace: the subsystem of technocratic 
governance was already emerging in the 1970s with the politics of insertion, and a 
politicised form of symbolic politics showed up by the early 1980s following the 
rise of the Le Pen-movement (Feldblum 1999). 
 The perceived Dutch exceptionalism in immigration and integration 
policymaking stems in particular from the combination of a persistent top-down 
policy formulation and what was a relatively late politicisation of the topics. More 
than elsewhere, immigration and integration policies have been formulated mainly 
on the national level, within centralised and strongly institutionalised subsystems 
involving the participation of a limited number of actors. The scale of public 
debate was actively limited for a considerable time, thus evading the politicisation 
of these sensitive issues.  
 Our analysis has put forward some explanations for this specific Dutch 
exceptionalism. First of all, we analysed, in terms of an internal dynamics, how the 
subsystem form of governance could persist in the Netherlands for such an 
extended period of time. Given the societal definitions that separated immigration 
from integration, and thanks to the subsequent de-politicisation of the topics, 
specific policy coalitions could develop. In the domain of immigrant integration, 
iron triangles supported group-specific policies in the 1970s, to be succeeded in the 
next decade by the strongly centralised technocratic structure. In the domain of 
immigration, the topic has long been implicitly defined as a ‘non-issue’ that led to 
ad hoc reactive policies and coalitions in policymaking. This sub-system model 
became criticised in the course of the 1990s, but showed simultaneously a great 
resistance to change. It was after the turn of the millennium that this subsystem 
pattern of governance disappeared, that the two policy topics got tied up together 
– in a very specific way, no less – and then became issues of high politics.  
 Explaining the situation on an altogether different level, we explored 
external factors that may account for Dutch exceptionalism. First of all, the Dutch 
legacy of pillarism, in the form of a political culture of conflict accommodation and 
consensus searching, may explain why policymaking has for so long remained 
behind closed doors in the Netherlands. This history of pillarism contributed to 
the framing of immigrants as ‘minorities’, as well as to the initial development of a 
multicultural policy approach. It may also have contributed to the tendency to 
depoliticise issues such as immigration and integration that were ‘too hot to handle’ 
for politics. We have argued how the Fortuyn Revolt in Dutch politics that led to 
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the emergence of a more confrontational political style may be interpreted as much 
as a revolt against the legacy of pillarisation as against specific immigration and 
integration policies.  
 Furthermore, we have argued that changes in the Dutch welfare state – 
from a corporatist model to a neo-liberal one – have been influential, catalysing 
modifications in the policy objectives and target populations of policy. Finally, as 
immigration and integration became issues of electoral politics, they have merged 
with macro-political issues, such as a collective unease with the Dutch political 
establishment and concerns about national identity and social cohesion. As such, 
the issues have become symbols for a ‘New Politics’ that tries to regain popular 
legitimacy by articulating the voice of ‘the ordinary citizen’ and adopting a neo-
conservative line of tough policies.  
 A crucial question concerns how the near future will develop vis-à-vis 
conflicts within the growing gap between these new politics and policies – 
predominantly manifested at the national level – and other partners in 
policymaking and implementation. Critique and resistance arrive from different 
sides: civil society organisations including churches, employers, trade unions and 
immigrant organisations, European and international institutions, but also 
particularly from local government pressing for approaches to immigration and 
integration that are less symbolic and more problem-solving.  
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